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Abstract
The immediate job of project evaluation is to decide what worked and what didn’t. However, the more
challenging task is making sense of why success or failure occurred and in so doing to propose appropriate
future action. Effective evaluation of conflict resolution initiatives is complicated since interventions involve
multiple goals and cross-level connections where indirect effects are often not seen in the short-run. This
paper argues that there is no single best instrument or method for evaluating the extent to which conflict
resolution practice has been successful. However, this does not mean that evaluation should be ignored.
Instead projects need to develop methods that are good enough to be applied in contextually appropriate
ways. To assist in this process, this article offers six guidelines for deciding when, how, and the extent to which
specific conflict resolution interventions are effective. Good evaluation requires a self-conscious effort to
articulate the most significant goals of different groups of participants and to track goal evolution in the course
of a project using multiple, operational criteria. It should addresses the question of transfer, the ways in which
direct work with only a small number of project participants, is expected to have more extensive, indirect
effects on the course of the wider conflict. If it is done well, good evaluation helps practitioners define future
activities and helps interveners and funders to imagine good-enough conflict management asking not whether
they have fully resolved a complicated conflict but whether they have improved conditions sufficiently so that
the parties in the conflict are more likely to develop the capacity to manage it constructively in the future.
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Abstract 
 
The immediate job of project evaluation is to decide what worked and what 
didn’t. However, the more challenging task is making sense of why success 
or failure occurred and in so doing to propose appropriate future action. 
Effective evaluation of conflict resolution initiatives is complicated since 
interventions involve multiple goals and cross-level connections where 
indirect effects are often not seen in the short-run. This paper argues that 
there is no single best instrument or method for evaluating the extent to 
which conflict resolution practice has been successful. However, this does 
not mean that evaluation should be ignored. Instead projects need to develop 
methods that are good enough to be applied in contextually appropriate 
ways. To assist in this process, this article offers six guidelines for deciding 
when, how, and the extent to which specific conflict resolution interventions 
are effective. Good evaluation requires a self-conscious effort to articulate 
the most significant goals of different groups of participants and to track 
goal evolution in the course of a project using multiple, operational criteria. 
It should addresses the question of transfer, the ways in which direct work 
with only a small number of project participants, is expected to have more 
extensive, indirect effects on the course of the wider conflict. If it is done 
well, good evaluation helps practitioners define future activities and helps 
interveners and funders to imagine good-enough conflict management asking 
not whether they have fully resolved a complicated conflict but whether they 
have improved conditions sufficiently so that the parties in the conflict are 
more likely to develop the capacity to manage it constructively in the future. 1 
 
Introduction 
 
The immediate job of project evaluation is to decide what worked and 
what did not. However, the more challenging task is making sense of why 
success or failure occurred, and in so doing to propose appropriate future 
                                                 
1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the USIP Symposium on Best Practices in Conflict 
Resolution Training, Washington, D. C. June 2000 and at the Annual Meeting of the International 
Society for Political Psychology, Cuernavaca Mexico July 2001. 
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action. Both success and failure can teach us a good deal about what 
constitutes effective conflict resolution, but only when we are able to 
comprehend their significance and draw lessons from them. To do this we 
must see conflict resolution practice as derived from working hypotheses 
about human behavior, specific conflicts, and plausible ways to modify them. 
From this perspective, evaluation must consider evidence from two different 
sources of failure (a) those arising from the specific training and intervention 
methods and/or (b) those resulting from an incorrect hypotheses about the 
conflict itself.  
Effective evaluation of conflict resolution initiatives is complicated 
for several reasons. Most conflict resolution practice involves multiple goals, 
diverse participants, shifting time frames, and seeks change in behaviors, 
perceptions, and/or institutional practices. There is uncertainty about the 
relationship between the direct effects of a project on those who participate 
in it and its more indirect impact on the wider context in which the project is 
embedded—the problem of transfer (Kelman 1995). The deceptively simple 
question then of how to decide when conflict resolution is effective is often 
not one that can be answered easily.  
Any evaluation has to begin with that project’s specific goals while, 
at the same time, recognizing that project funders, implementers and 
participants may not all have the same goals or motivations for participating 
in a project. Central to goal articulation is making explicit the presumed 
linkages between a project’s goals, its specific activities, and how these can 
impact the larger conflict. Many projects, for example, emphasize that 
success in conflict resolution should produce an improvement in the 
relationship between opposing communities and build a capacity for 
disputing parties to manage future problems. But there is a great deal of 
variation in how practitioners try to accomplish these goals—some do this 
through capacity building, others through sustained dialogue to reframe 
intergroup perceptions, and others emphasize the articulation and 
achievement of joint goals.  Consequently, it is important to understand 
success in terms of multiple (often continuous) criteria—what Rothman calls 
“pieces of peace” (Ross 2000b; Rothman 1992). This means that there is no 
single best instrument or method for evaluating conflict resolution practice. 
As a result my objective here is not to say how to do program evaluation nor 
is it to evaluate any specific project. Rather it is to encourage approaches that 
support different forms of “good enough conflict management” (Ross 
2000b). Good enough conflict management improves the relationship 
between parties in a conflict and is a developmental, transformative process 
that works to build institutions and practices that allow the parties to deal 
with tensions and differences more constructively than they had in the past.  
The discussion of evaluation in conflict resolution here has three 
parts. The first section discusses theories of practice, project goals, and the 
roles each plays in evaluation. The next section draws on research Jay 
Rothman and I conducted in the 1990’s on the theory and practice of non-
governmental conflict resolution interventions. It discusses difficulties 
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employing traditional evaluation methods in conflict resolution work, and 
argues that just because evaluation is difficult and imperfect doesn’t mean it 
should be avoided. There is no one best way to evaluate all projects, but 
when results using a variety of methods and indicators converge, we can be 
more confident (Campbell and Fiske 1959). The final section offers six 
guidelines to designing evaluation to decide when, how, and the extent to 
which, specific conflict resolution projects are effective. They emphasize that 
good evaluation requires a self-conscious effort to articulate the most 
significant goals for different groups of participants and to track goal 
evolution in the course of a project using multiple, operational criteria. In 
addition, evaluation should addresses the question of transfer, the ways in 
which direct work with only a small number of project participants, is 
expected to have more extensive, indirect effects on the course of the wider 
conflict. If it is done well, good evaluation helps practitioners define future 
activities and helps interveners and funders to imagine good-enough conflict 
management asking not whether they have fully resolved a complicated 
conflict but whether they have improved conditions sufficiently so that the 
parties in the conflict have developed the capacity to manage it 
constructively in the future. 
 
Theories of Practice and Project Goals 
 
Theories of practice. All practice is grounded in beliefs about the 
nature of social, political, and psychological reality. These often implicit 
worldviews guide practitioners and provide keys to understanding how they 
expect to produce their intended effects. Making these core beliefs explicit 
permits us to better understand the working assumptions underlying specific 
projects interveners design, to articulate the theory of intervention consistent 
with these assumptions, and to revise practice if, and when, the core 
assumptions on which the project is based are found to be are imprecise or 
unwarranted.2 It is especially useful to make explicit practitioner’s 
assumptions about the roots of the conflict in which he or she is working to 
understand how these assumptions affect the design of an intervention, and 
the criteria used to evaluate the project’s success. 
Theories of practice are particularly important if we are to understand 
how practitioners approach a conflict and what they believe would happen to 
the wider conflict if their programmatic goals were achieved. In a recent 
comparison of six theories of ethnic conflict3  resolution, I found a great deal 
                                                 
2 The terms worldview or schema describe the core assumptions about how the world one 
lives in works, about the motives of different social actors, and about the consequences of 
action on others. All social actors possess such theories, and the ones of particular interest 
here are the assumptions sonflict resolution practitioners make about the nature of identity 
based conflict, what can be done to manage it constructively, and judgments about what 
constitutes success and failure in conflict resolution.  
3 There are many who prefer the term identity based conflict, communal conflict or 
enthnopolitical conflict rather than ethnic conflict since most of these conflict are not about 
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of variation in how practitioners thought about conflict and what they tried to 
do to mitigate it (Ross 2000a). I found a wide range of assumptions about the 
presumed causes of conflict, great variation in specific strategies of conflict 
resolution, and quite varied criteria of success even among practitioners 
working on the same conflict. Figure 1 (reprinted from Ross, 2000b) presents 
six different approaches to practice in ethnic conflict resolution: community 
relations, principled negotiation, human needs, identity, intercultural 
miscommunication and conflict transformation. There are few direct 
disagreements between the approaches, but each one has a very different 
emphasis in how they define conflict, what concrete steps they take to 
address it, what are its indictors of success, and how they presume cross-
level transfer will occur. Understanding the diversity of theories of practice 
is important to consider the wide range of goals in conflict resolution 
projects. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1: MAJOR THEORIES OF PRACTICE OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
(Reprinted from Ross, 2000b) 
 
 Causes and/or 
nature of ethnic 
conflict 
Goals 
Effects on 
participants in 
interventions 
Mechanism for 
achieving 
effects 
Transfer: 
Impact on the 
wider conflict 
Community  
Relations 
On-going 
polarization, distrust, 
and hostility between 
groups exacerbate 
existing conflict 
Improving 
communication 
and 
understanding; 
promoting 
tolerance 
acceptance of 
diversity; 
encouraging 
structures 
which 
safeguard rights 
of all 
Build 
community self 
esteem through 
successful local 
institutions and 
projects making 
decisions on 
issues 
important in 
daily life 
Self-esteem, 
efficacy and 
reinforcement 
from prior 
successes 
through local 
institution 
building 
Increased 
community 
capability and 
self-esteem 
facilities 
cooperative 
problem 
solving on 
matters of 
mutual interest  
                                                                                                                             
ethnicity per se. While I think there is much of merit in this claim, I use ethnic conflict here 
to be consistent with my earlier usage in the larger project. 
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Principled 
negotiation 
Incompatible 
positions and zero 
sum view of conflict 
Positive sum 
agreements 
between the 
parties—i.e. 
ones which 
provide for 
mutual gain 
Build analytic 
ability to 
identify mutual 
interests and 
devise solutions 
which offer 
mutual gain 
Separate people 
from the 
problems; focus 
on interests not 
positions; 
generate 
possibilities for 
mutual gain; 
use objective 
standards to 
judge outcomes 
Spread of skills 
to others; 
increased sense 
that agreements 
are possible; 
benefits to 
communities 
from prior 
agreements 
Human needs  Unmet or frustrated 
basic needs  
Shared 
recognition of 
core needs and 
exploration of 
ways to meet 
them through 
joint action 
Discovery of 
shared goals 
and objectives; 
recognition of 
common needs; 
greater sense of 
choices and op-
tions 
Problem 
solving 
workshops led 
by skilled third 
parties who 
encourage 
analytic 
dialogue 
Transfer of new 
perspectives 
from 
influentials and 
near influences 
changes the 
idea of what is 
possible for the 
wider 
community 
Identity Threatened identity 
rooted in unresolved 
past loss and 
suffering 
Changed 
relations 
through mutual 
recognition; 
development of 
a sense that 
agreement is 
possible; 
lowering fears 
to allow 
exploring 
options 
Overcomes 
barriers to 
dialogue by 
focusing on 
deep identity is-
sues involved in 
past losses so 
the parties learn 
what possible 
agreements can 
offer 
Mourning past 
losses and 
suffering; track 
2 and other 
channels which 
focus on 
identity threats 
and fears; 
symbolic and 
ritual action to 
affirm group 
identity 
New under-
standing of the 
conflict through 
changes in 
discourse and 
symbolic 
actions which 
feed new 
understandings 
into the policy 
process 
Intercultural  
miscommunication 
Incompatibilities 
between different 
cultural commu-
nication styles 
Effective 
intergroup 
communication; 
weakening 
negative 
stereotypes 
Builds 
awareness of 
other cultures; 
develops new 
metaphors; 
information 
exchange to 
overcome 
cultural barriers 
to effective 
communication 
Increased 
awareness of 
communication 
barriers; use of 
third party 
‘translators’; 
deconstruction 
of historical 
accounts 
Improved 
communication 
makes it easier 
to reach 
agreements and 
increased public 
support for 
cooperation 
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Conflict 
transformation 
Real problems of 
inequality and 
injustice expressed 
through  socially and 
culturally constructed 
meanings 
Changing 
relationships 
and moral 
growth which 
produces 
justice, 
forgiveness and 
reconciliation 
Transforms 
relationships to 
produce self-
reliant persons; 
empowerment 
and recognition 
Elicitive 
training which 
develops 
culturally 
relevant models 
of conflict 
resolution; 
mediation 
aimed at 
empowerment 
and recognition 
Empowerment 
leads to 
transformation 
of relationships 
in the larger 
society built on 
culturally 
appropriate 
models 
 
Understanding goals. Over the past decade, there has been 
widespread attention paid to the various ways to prevent or end destructive 
ethnic conflicts and civil wars. Governments and international organizations 
have considered and adopted options such as the development of early 
warning systems, preventative diplomacy, training special negotiation and 
mediation teams, and the development of multinational rapid reactions teams 
to intervene in ethnic conflicts that escalate out of control. Non-
governmental organizations engage in less expensive, faster, more flexible, 
more focused, more limited and far less politically complicated interventions 
than governmental and/or international efforts. Sometimes non-governmental 
entities try to address very specific concerns through the provision of 
particular services or the creation of institutional structures valued by all 
sides. At other times they work to create a context in which the parties can 
explore options while getting to know those on the other side without 
committing themselves publicly to political risks.  
Most governmental efforts focus on achieving a formal settlement 
(which in some cases may be no more than a separation of the warring 
parties) or in implementing an agreement once one is reached. Non-
governmental groups rarely seek to broker a peace or implement a formal 
accord. They are far more likely to focus on creating the preconditions that 
might move the parties to the table where more formal negotiations can take 
place, encourage acceptance and implementation of an existing agreement, 
and alter relations among disputants. This is not surprising for non-
governmental organizations do not possess the resources or political clout to 
broker an agreement or implement one that has been reached. Rather non-
governmental projects are widely viewed as possessing important 
capabilities that can complement those of governments and 
intergovernmental organizations. These initiatives exist in dozens of settings 
and in some there are literally dozens of projects in place. Their rapid 
development raises the question of how we decide when, why, and in what 
ways these efforts are successful. We are left with the question of what 
constitutes success and failure for most of these initiatives, and how do they 
or their funders evaluate them.  
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In thinking about conflict resolution goals, it is analytically useful to 
distinguish between internal criteria of a project’s success and external 
criteria which are those linking a project’s activities to the conflict as a 
whole.4   For example, an intervention that brings Israeli and Palestinian 
schoolchildren together might define success in terms of internal criteria 
such as the extent to which they learn about each other’s traditions, develop a 
more nuanced appreciation of the other side’s values, and treat members of 
the other group differently than they had in the past. External criteria of 
success would measure how such an intervention moves the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict towards a viable settlement or changes daily life in their 
community. Such criteria would be derived from a theory of linkage that 
hypothesizes how changes in individual (and small group) beliefs and 
behaviors, such as those of the school children in this hypothetical project, 
can eventually affect the kinds of larger political agreements political leaders 
make.5  
Rothman and Ross found that among the projects they studied, while 
interventions are not always able to fully articulate their objectives, for the 
most part they do a far better job in spelling out internal than external ones 
(Ross and Rothman 1999). What this means is that their theories of practice 
are more explicit about how their actions should affect the people with whom 
they work than about how they are likely to affect the course of the wider 
conflict in which the intervention occurs. The problem, however, is that 
while the rhetoric of project designs generally encourages broad claims about 
how a project will make a difference in the wider society, the connection 
between a project’s daily activities and this rhetoric are not well articulated. 
Furthermore, this imprecision sometimes leads to disappointment with 
conflict resolution efforts when it is subsequently found that project activities 
fail to transform a society as promised. This was certainly the case with 
Doob’s interactive conflict resolution workshops (Fisher 1997).  
Another major finding was that rarely are intervener’s initial goals 
the same ones that emerge as projects develop over time. This was 
particularly clear when we they got practitioners to articulate specific project 
goals and not just general “all purpose” objectives, such as making peace. 
This should not be surprising for a number of reasons. First of all, conflicts 
themselves change and so do the goals of intervention efforts. Second, 
organizations evolve as they learn what they are good at and what they are 
not, as sources of funding shift, and as personnel develop particular skills 
and concerns. Third, conflict resolution practitioners develop new insights 
and methods that lead to changes in how, what, and why they do what they 
                                                 
4  I find it useful to consider this distinction as parallel to the one between internal and 
external validity (Campbell and Stanley, 1963). Internal criteria of success are those over 
which a project exercises a good deal of control while external criteria of success are refer to 
the wider impact of an intervention.  
5  Kelman (1995) provides a good discussion of this issue in the context of the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process. 
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do. All this means that an intervention’s goals are likely to evolve over time. 
At the same time however, too few projects could articulate specific 
operational objectives, and as a result know when or how to alter their 
behavior in response to changing conditions or feedback.6   
Rothman and Ross found that practice is often opportunistic (in the 
good sense), taking advantage of unanticipated possibilities. Effective 
projects are, no doubt, responsive their environment, which means they can 
make mid-steam course changes.  Flexible and proactive program design in 
response to emerging trends can be very useful but hard to anticipate, and 
difficult to evaluate using traditional evaluation procedures. So while being 
opportunistic may be good policy, it is also tough on evaluation. 
 
Limits to Traditional Evaluation Tools 
 
Traditional evaluation grows out of experimental and quasi-
experimental traditions (Campbell and Cook 1979; Campbell and Stanley 
1963; Pawson and Tilley 1997; Rossi, et al. 1999).7 Many of the procedures 
these require are hard, if not impossible, to apply in conflict resolution work 
carried on in the context of sometimes-bitter conflicts. Where typically there 
are often more independent variables than cases, no random assignment of 
subjects to treatment groups, difficulty in gaining pre and post test measures, 
changing contexts in which interventions are implemented, shifting goals, 
uncertainty about what constitutes success, problems of instrumentation, 
selection bias, reactivity, too few resources, and poor designs. In addition, 
there can be additional issues of confidentiality and data collection that 
further limit evaluation work. Often at best qualitative, not quantitative, data 
are all that is available to judge whether a program or activity was successful 
(Robson 2000; Shaw 1999). So why don’t we just pack it in? The most 
important reason is because despite the fact that evaluation cannot be perfect 
doesn’t mean that what can be not be useful (Pawson and Tilley 1997). On 
the contrary, I argue that good evaluation in conflict resolution requires 
making the best judgments possible in tough circumstances.8 
Conflict resolution projects are generally small-scale initiatives with 
10-20 participants and activities that are not easy to replicate in standard 
formats. As a result, when significant effects are found, one can legitimately 
                                                 
6  Rothman and Ross asked a number of project directors about parts of their initiatives that 
had not been successful. Interestingly those projects which stuck us as more successful—and 
certainly more interesting—had no trouble giving us precise answers to this question while 
projects which were less defined (sometimes because they were more recent in origin) 
frequently could not provide much detail and tried to evade it. 
7  There is a huge literature on evaluation that is not the main focus of this paper. For 
example, see Rossi et al, 1999 and Pawson and Tilley, 1997 for a good review of the field. 
8 Don Campbell once told me that he was appalled that many people understood his work on 
quasi-experimental designs as saying that good research was not possible outside the 
laboratory. He meant it to empower researchers to improve field research on important 
questions. 
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ask the extent to which they can be attributed to the content of the 
intervention as opposed to the personal characteristics of the intervener(s). 
Another methodological problem is that interventions are rarely isolated 
changes in a social or political environment. It is not realistic to think we can 
be very precise about the degree to which any single intervention is 
responsible for diminished political violence or any move towards settlement 
that might emerge.9  All this makes it difficult to attribute subsequent 
changes in a conflict to a single intervention although many interveners 
clearly believe their work made a significant contribution. In short, when 
there are independent variables and possible interaction effects it is hard to 
be very certain about when a project has a clear impact and when observed 
effects reflect the sentiments of a well-intentioned intervener.  
 
Internal versus External Criteria of Success 
 
The distinction between internal vs. external criteria of success raised 
above is central to the issue of evaluation. While all projects seek to have an 
impact on the people and groups with which they work, the cross-level 
transfer that produces changes in the larger conflict in which it is located are 
critical to long-term success (Kelman 1995; Maoz forthcoming). Here I say 
more about internal and external criteria of success raising questions of how 
transfer works in conflict resolution interventions.  
Internal criteria. Internal criteria of success indicate the extent to 
which a project achieved its immediate goals. Specific context-based criteria 
are needed if these are to be adequately assessed. Effective projects not only 
are attentive to how and when they are meeting their goals, but they are also 
characterized by the existence of multiple and sophisticated indicators of 
success. Multiple indicators of success and failure are necessary because 
exclusive reliance on one indicator will fail to measure the multi-dimensional 
nature of most interventions. Shifts in interests and interpretations are often 
subtle and are rarely tapped effectively with a single measure.  Sophisticated 
notions about success are also worth developing (Maoz, forthcoming). For 
example, attention to changes in people’s stories, modification of affect, 
shifts in the events are emphasized in narratives, and the use of new language 
and metaphors tells a great deal about how an intervention affects 
participants—although these are difficult to measure. Behavioral change 
measures are particularly good indicators of an intervention’s effect—or its 
absence. While most interventions are ultimately interested in changes in 
behavior, Rothman and Ross (1999) found that few projects develop explicit 
measures of changes of the parties’ interests even though such measures 
could provide useful indicators of an intervention’s effects.   
                                                 
9 This leads to the hyoothesis that perhaps single projects cannot be fully evaluated by 
themselves but must be understood in terms of what else is taking place in a region, the need 
for a division of labor and specialization among projects, and a consideration of what 
projects accomplish themselves but also what they accomplish in working with others. How 
to do this is not intuitively obvious. 
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While articulating clear internal criteria of success is important, 
Rothman and Ross (1999) found that evaluation is sometimes transformed 
from a mechanism of self-correction to a self-serving one. An obvious 
example of this involves asking participants in a workshop or training 
session to evaluate the intervention through a questionnaire. Many of the 
questions are worded in such as way as to favor a positive response, a 
problem which is compounded in situations where people are paid to 
participate and believe that their future remuneration is tied to their answers. 
Pre- and post-workshop data can be valuable, but only if there is some 
integrity to the process.10 Similarly, one should be critical of measures of 
success which simply count the number of participants in workshops or the 
number of cases processed without providing attitudinal or behavioral 
outcomes of an intervention.  
 
External Criteria 
 
The question of external criteria of success links the specific effects 
of an intervention to the wider conflict in which it occurs. While projects 
generally have a good sense of internal criteria, Rothman and Ross (1999) 
found that there was far less explicit articulation of the link between these 
goals and the impact they expect their achievement to have on the wider 
societal conflict.11  While no small intervention can be expected to end a 
long-term intransigent conflict itself, one can ask practitioners to hypothesize 
what specific impact a project, or a group of projects, should be expected to 
have on the larger conflict. Yet Ross and Rothman found that few 
practitioners could articulate explicit hypotheses about spillover and 
multiplier effects. I suggest that spelling out these hypotheses is often less 
difficult than interveners believe and could lead to significant learnings about 
what does and does not work in conflict resolution. 
Here Kelman’s work stands out (Kelman, 1987; Kelman, 1995). 
Since Kelman began problem-solving workshops in the Middle East in the 
early 1970’s, he has been clear on who he sought to participate in his 
workshops—unofficial near-influentials; what he wanted them to acquire—a 
clearer sense of the other side’s thinking; and how he believed they would 
have an impact on Israeli and Palestinian societies—injecting new ideas into 
                                                 
10 Rarely do projects collect data after a significant passage of time to see if the effects found 
in a workshop are still present a year or two later. 
11  Knox (1993) is a real exception here. He was interested in the impact of the effect of 
adoption of community relations programs by local councils in Northern Ireland. Using 
comparative survey data, he found that over a four-year period the program had an impact 
on attitudes concerning fair employment, prejudice, and tolerance. Perhaps the effects were 
confounded with the independent variable in that councils adopting the program may have 
been located in areas more predisposed to attitude change. Nonetheless, he makes the case 
that even if this took place, putting these programs in place still had an independent impact 
on attitudes. To me, the key point is the seriousness of the effort to measure a program’s 
wider impact. 
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public discourse including the notions that there were people on the other 
side to talk to and things to talk about with them (Kelman, 1987, 1995; 
Fisher, 1997: Chapter 3). At the same time, I am not aware of any systematic 
effort to assess the extent to which his hypotheses about the dynamics of 
transfer are correct. In part this is because Kelman has long felt that issues of 
confidentiality needed to take precedence over collection of data that could 
be used in evaluation. In addition, even if Kelman had been determined to 
measure transfer, the task would have been daunting. It would not have been 
easy to say, for example, that when public discourse did shift in Israel and 
Palestine, it was because of the interactive conflict resolution workshops and 
not one or more of the dozens of other initiatives going on at the time, or 
changes in international and regional politics. 
Good, measurable, external criteria of success are especially difficult 
to develop in situations since often the objectives include preventing 
undesirable events from taking place. For example, a project may try to halt 
the spread of intergroup violence and may take deliberate steps to limit tit-
for-tat reprisals between groups or seek to ease relations between the police 
and local communities. Since the goal is to prevent undesirable events, such 
as retaliatory violence, how are we to decide the extent to which the 
intervention is the reason why such an event fails to occur? Only if there is 
an explicit statement of expectations (counter-factuals) against which 
outcomes are evaluated is this possible. 
Faced with significant barriers to traditional evaluation, conflict 
resolution practitioners need to follow Campbell’s advice and find ways to 
make important decisions about what works and what doesn’t as best they 
can. Sound theory and incomplete knowledge must be the guide. In the spirit 
of improving our capacity to make better decisions I offer three different 
tests which might help evaluate a project’s effects. While none of them is 
infallible, agreement across them might be sufficient (if not fully adequate) 
to decide what was successful in an intervention. 
Face validity. Is it plausible that the activities of a project are likely 
to have contributed to an outcome (or a non-outcome)? For example, Kelman 
(1995) suggests why it is likely that problem-solving workshops and various 
Track 2 efforts significantly contributed to the 1993 Oslo Accord and 
subsequent Israeli-Palestinian agreement. He argues that these interventions 
over 20 years significantly altered the frames of reference of both political 
elites and the mass public as well as showing key figures on both sides both 
that there was someone on the other side with whom they could talk. While 
Kelman doesn’t assert his workshops were more important than the end of 
the cold war and the PLO’s weakened political position following the Gulf 
War, he builds a plausible case that conflict resolution mattered, and this 
claim has face validity for many familiar with the Oslo process. 
Consistency with theory. A second test is whether an outcome is 
consistent (or clashes) with one or more accepted social science theories. 
This test can be particularly useful in raising questions about well-
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intentioned but naive interventions.12 For example, claiming significant 
impact as a result of short-term interventions, such as training sessions, flies 
in the face of what is widely accepted about the need for social support for 
attitude and behavior change, the sometimes negative effects of intergroup 
contact, and the problems people in emotionally charged situations have in 
transferring learnings across social settings or individuals.13  Similarly, 
methodological considerations, such as those Campbell and Stanley (1963) 
raise ought to make us cautious about claims of the impact of particular 
micro-level events on macro-outcomes. Unfortunately, issues of selection 
bias, reactivity, and instrumentation, can lead wishful thinking that leads 
interveners to believe that their impact is greater than it really is. Faced with 
this kind of question, the best thing to do is to gather multiple, independent 
measures that point in a common direction as well as parallel results across 
workshops and contexts. 
Consensus among disputants. Face validity generally refers to 
reactions from implementers and outside observers. Another useful test of a 
project’s impact could come from the members of the disputing communities 
themselves. Two different kinds of evidence might be sought. One would try 
to collect local perceptions about why particular outcomes had or had not 
come about. For example, at the time of the cease fires in Northern Ireland in 
1994 there were many conflict resolution specialists (and other observers) 
who warned that there were likely to be continuing violent incidents similar 
to those had taken place in South Africa and Israel-Palestine following initial 
agreements because, the wisdom went, the paramilitary groups could not 
control all their members. Yet since 1994 there has been only one major 
violent incident and all parties in the region denounced this one.14 Why? Is it 
because the paramilitaries do have more control over their followers than is 
assumed or is it because there was sufficient buy-in to the political 
                                                 
12 Theory, of course, is not always clear abou what to expect. For example, should attitude or 
behavioral change come first? how might changes in one affect the other? However, theory 
is especially useful in rejecting what seem to be overly optimistic claims projects make in 
either a burst of enthusiasm or as part of their appeal to funders. 
13 Boltjes (1999) reports on one project that got large funding although there was little 
theoretical reason to think it could have worked. The Conflict Management Group sought to 
transformthe culture of the former Soviet Union from a culture of hierarchy into a culture of 
negotiations. Considering that the specific project activities involved working with a 
relatively small elite, groups for very limited amounts of time such sweeping goals are 
clearly inconsistent with virtually any plausible theory of social or political change to which 
either project should have had access. We simply have no good theories that would allow us 
to expect that intense workshops, even (and sometimes especially) with highly influential 
political figures, are hardly likely to lead to sweeping culture change (especially in a country 
as large and complex as Russia).  
14 There have been many smaller scale incidents especially in neighborhoods in Belfast as 
well as internecine violence particularly involving Protestant paramilitaries. In addition there 
have been regular confrontations, sometime involving violence, around parades in 
Portadown and a few other areas. 
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agreements to limit the violence? Was it the widespread public support for 
ending the violence? Learning what people think is at work can be useful—
particularly if the answers are consistent with the first two tests. Second, one 
might try to get the reactions of a more focused sample of community 
leaders, political and security officials to see to what extent they find specific 
interventions effective in their eyes. While political perspectives may color 
such reactions, they might also help us learn about what makes certain 
projects effective. Finally, when a project conducts multiple workshops over 
time, the reflections of returning participants might provide particularly good 
evidence of how the project has been effective to date.  
 
What “Good Enough” Evaluation Looks Like 
 
The previous pages offer an approach to thinking about evaluation in conflict 
resolution. The emphasis is on doing the best possible job in complicated 
situations. Good enough evaluation improves conflict resolution in three 
ways. First, at the level of specific projects, it provides rapid and effective 
feedback so that ineffective activities are dropped and ones that are working 
are enhanced. Rothman has developed a formal set of procedures, Action 
Evaluation, which tries to make such changes and adjustments during the 
course of an intervention (Ross, 2001; Rothman, 1998). It involves all 
stakeholders in reflection on goals, the extent to which they have been 
achieved, and their redefinition over time. Second, for communities in which 
interventions are taking place, evaluation can provide tangible evidence of 
desired change that may be crucial in a political climate where interventions 
(by insiders or outsiders) are viewed skeptically. Third, sound and effective 
evaluation can help funders feel more confident about what they are getting 
for the money they spend. When funders better appreciate what evaluation 
can and cannot provide, they may be more likely to continue to be engaged 
in the field. This process is one which includes educating agencies and 
foundations about not only what works and what doesn't, but what is realistic 
to achieve, the importance of partial successes, and the long term nature of 
transforming most bitter, intransigent conflicts.  
The spirit of the argument here is not to offer a simple evaluation checklist 
that can be used across situations. Rather, I propose six guidelines that 
follow from the perspective offered here to help decide whether and how 
conflict resolution projects (or parts of them) are effective or not.  
(1) Good evaluation requires a self-conscious effort to articulate the 
most significant goals of disputants and interveners and to track goal 
evolution over time. In many long-term conflicts the demands of groups in 
conflict appear to be like a shifting target. When initial demands are met, 
newer ones arise. In part this is because the conflict itself evolves, and in part 
because settling one set of issues brings others to the fore. For example, in 
Northern Ireland when the British reimposition of direct rule in the region 
significantly diminished the most blatant public sector anti-Catholic 
discrimination—a primary goal of the late 1960’s Civil Rights Movement, a 
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new set of demands came to the fore having to do with the constitutional 
arrangements of the north. The 1998 Good Friday Agreement provided a 
constitutional arrangement and questions including Loyal Order parades, 
police restructuring and decommissioning of weapons became focal points of 
the conflict. Finally, it is wrong to assume that the goals of the parties locked 
in conflict are clear to themselves and to their opponents. This is not always 
the case. 
Goals of conflict resolution initiatives evolve in response to both 
disputants needs and changing conditions. The challenges of pre-settlement 
and post-settlement periods are, for example, often very different and quite 
different goals are appropriate in each. Rothman and I felt that projects we 
intuitively sensed were vibrant and effective often develop new and/or 
changing goals over time. Although there was no explicit time dimension in 
our analysis, we contend that evolved objectives, when clearly articulated in 
an operational manner, regularly evaluated, and revised can serve as 
powerful tools for program development. Rothman then made this central to 
his concept of Action Evaluation (1998). More attention to goals—and the 
articulation of operational indicators of their success or failure—will mean 
more realistic and careful planning of projects, but also more self-conscious 
linkage between goals and the specific activities in which a project engages.  
Goals do not always change, but the ways that participants talk about 
their own and those on the other side can shift in important ways. To 
understand this dynamic, evaluation can look at how discourse changes, the 
degree to which each side is able to employ the others’ language and 
metaphors, changes in adverbs and adjectives indicate decrease negative 
affect, the number and intensity of blame statements, and the degree of 
sustained back-and-forth dialogue as opposed to one-sided pronouncements.  
(2) Good evaluation spells out operational criteria of success linked 
to specific project activities, and seeks good evidence to determine the 
degree to which they have been met. This is often harder than it sounds. 
Many practitioners bristle at being pinned down in terms of specific 
operational goals. They contend that goal setting often cannot be done up 
front. Surely this is correct at one level. However, at some point vague goals 
such as “increasing understanding between two communities,” or “providing 
conflict resolution training to 2000 people” without saying what they will do 
with it is not good enough. Good evaluation requires spelling out criteria so a 
project knows when goals have not been achieved as well as when they have. 
When goals are too vague, it is easy for interveners to avoid deciding that 
something they are doing is or is not effective or that their theory is 
inadequate. Just because clear goals are enunciated, does not mean they 
won’t shift over time. In addition, we need to better understand the disputing 
parties’ changing goals, and changing priorities of conflict resolution 
initiatives. When and how do they evolve, converge, diverge and what are 
the problems for practice these produce?  
Interventions vary greatly in the time frame they adopt. For example, 
programs aimed at changing attitudes through school curricula can only 
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expect to have an impact over a relatively long period of time. Other 
interventions, such as the development of a mediation center in a local 
community, can realistically expect to have a faster impact. Longer-term 
goals are often more problematic to funders pushing project directors to 
show results relatively quickly. However, as Lederach (1997) argues, there is 
little theory that leads us to expect rapid transformation in conflicts. Rather 
an important task is communicating what is achievable in a given time frame 
and resisting the temptation to promise what there is no reason to believe can 
be delivered. 
(3) Good evaluation leads to the development of multiple criteria of 
success, and helps projects understand partial successes and failures. Specific 
goals often help both disputants and interveners to appreciate the many 
dimensions to a complex conflict and the ways in which there can be partial, 
but not insignificant, movement towards goal achievement. In Northern 
Ireland, if one only saw success in terms of a signed political agreement, for 
years conflict resolution would have been seen as a failure. However, other 
measures of success such as the level of effective power sharing between 
Protestants and Catholics in local councils would have given a different 
answer.  
While it is not always pleasing to politicians to announce partial 
successes, they need to understand the significance of the idea of pieces of 
peace. Existing theories of conflict resolution are partial and contingent, not 
general ones. They rarely compete with each other directly. Rather, each 
partial theory (Figure 1) is likely to be appropriate in some contexts and 
certain stages of a conflict. Gaining a better appreciation of the connections 
between theories, contexts, and stages is needed for good evaluation. Too 
many peacemakers have, at present, too little guidance from social science 
theory and evidence to be able to answer questions about how to proceed 
very easily either in general or in a particular case.  
(4) Good evaluation addresses the question of transfer, the ways in 
which direct work with only a small number of project participants is 
expected to have more extensive, indirect effects on the course of the wider 
conflict. The transfer problem is perhaps the thorniest issue for the field. The 
funding process encourages projects to make large claims about their impact 
when, in fact, more modest ones are warranted. As noted, Lederach (1997) 
argues deep change is a long-term process, and yet many funders want to 
show short-term effects. Just consider the decrease in interest in central and 
Eastern and Central Europe today as opposed to fifteen years ago to see how 
fickle funders can be. Perhaps if some opportunistic activists had not 
promised almost instant change, and had a keener appreciation of the 
dynamics of transfer, there would have been fewer, but more sustained, 
interventions.   
Another dimension of the question of transfer concerns what is the 
impact of a project after the short run funding ends. What is left? A common 
answer Rothman and I found is that good projects “need to leave something 
behind” meaning either functioning institutions that local groups would run 
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or particular skills (or even perspectives) which would continue to be 
valuable in the society. While this answer is not foolish, this mantra can be 
self-serving unless either (a) there is clearly a local expression of need for the 
institutions and skills, and (b) there is a clear commitment that the 
institutions are sufficiently valued locally and therefore will be maintained 
and that the skill training provided will benefit more than just those 
individuals who received it.  
(5) Good evaluation helps practitioners define future and stage 
appropriate, activities that variously build on what has been successful and/or 
modifies activities in light of what has not. Different stages of conflict 
require different kinds of interventions so generalizations across stages may 
be inappropriate. Elsewhere I hypothesize that in severe conflicts addressing 
hostile interpretations needs to precede efforts to bridge competing interests 
(Ross 1993: Chapter 8). Another important stage-linked consideration is 
when it is more appropriate to work separately with disputing groups and 
when they should be brought together. In Northern Ireland, for example, 
community relations efforts for years have emphasized the importance of 
“single tradition” work so that when people from the different sides get 
together interactions can be constructive. Another stage related consideration 
calls for examining the needs of disputants in pre-settlement and post-
settlement conflicts and emphasizing the different skills and resource 
required to be effective in each. By identifying specific tasks associated with 
particular stages, we may better spell out the contingent nature of success 
(Fisher, 1997).  
(6) Good evaluation helps disputants, interveners and funders to 
imagine good-enough conflict management (Ross, 2000a). it does this not by 
asking whether they have fully resolved a complicated conflict but whether 
they have improved conditions sufficiently so that the parties in the conflict 
are likely to develop the capacity to manage conflict constructively in the 
future. Successful management of ethnic conflicts is helped by the de-
velopment of models and examples of constructive dispute management. 
Such models can serve two purposes. One is to help develop specific 
techniques that can be applied to a wide range of conflicts. In recent years 
there has developed a small cottage industry of scholars and practitioners 
teaching particular methods of conflict management in a wide range of 
settings rather than accepting the idea that conflicts need to be either left 
alone to ripen or can only stopped by a strong third party. This effort needs 
to be greatly expanded and refined in a theoretically informed way to be 
relevant to conflicts in a range of cultural settings.  
A second purpose is more overtly political, aimed at changing the 
widely held beliefs that large-scale intractable conflicts such as those be-
tween ethnic groups are unresolvable. The success of the alternative dispute 
resolution movement and teaching conflict management approaches has been 
greatest in universities and in industrial settings. In these contexts, conflicts 
are often moderate to low in intensity, both the interpersonal and economic 
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rewards of new conflict management methods have been seen quickly.15  It 
may indeed be the case that there are very few examples of more severe 
conflict management with peace and justice. Or it may be how we think 
about such situations that particularly limit our ability to identify cases. The 
greatest conceptual danger comes from the post hoc nature of many social 
science analyses. Cases where some kind of accommodation is achieved 
become easy to dismiss as not relevant to the problem. Why? The fact that 
some kind of conflict management was achieved is used as evidence that the 
conflict couldn't have been so severe in the first place. Perhaps, but I doubt 
it. Good evaluation of conflict resolution initiatives would help see if this 
hunch is right or not. 
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